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The Future of Affirmative Action After
Fisher: Is It Time to End
and Not Mend It?
By R. LAWRENCE PURDY*
Introduction
I WISH TO THANK the University of San Francisco School of Law1
for inviting me to share my perspective on the role race continues to
play in the decisions that impact not only our own lives, but the lives
of our friends and neighbors, our colleagues at work, our children,
and our grandchildren—decisions such as who gets a particular job,
or who receives a letter of admission or a letter of rejection from our
nation’s flagship public universities, or from private universities like
this great university.
The fundamental question, of course, is what role, if any, should
race play in these decisions?
This was the precise issue I dealt with for the better part of seven
years during the two landmark University of Michigan lawsuits. You
know them as Grutter2 and Gratz.3 Both went all the way to the United
States Supreme Court in 2003. Both involved the use of heavily race-
conscious—but highly different—admissions policies administered by
the undergraduate and law schools at the University of Michigan.4
* Mr. Purdy was one of the pro bono trial and appellate counsel for plaintiffs in
Grutter and Gratz. He is an attorney in private practice in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and
currently serves as an adjunct faculty member at the University of St. Thomas School of
Law in Minneapolis.
1. This Article is an adaptation of the remarks delivered by the author during the
University of San Francisco Law Review Symposium on February 22, 2013. These com-
ments predate the decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308-09 (2003) (holding that achieving diversity
in higher education is a compelling state interest and that the use of race as one factor
among many in the admissions process is narrowly tailored to achieve diversity).
3. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 295 (2003) (holding that the quantification of
race in the admissions process is not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity in higher
education).
4. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 256-57; Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.
Supp. 2d 821, 836-41 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“[T]he evidence indisputably demonstrates that
301
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The rationale offered by the University as justification for resorting to
the use of race was the University’s claimed compelling interest in en-
rolling a racially diverse student body.5
There are two reasons that I agreed to jump into these cases back
in 1997. The first is that Brown v. Board of Education6—in my view, the
greatest decision ever handed down by our Supreme Court—estab-
lished the clear principle that “racial discrimination in public educa-
tion is unconstitutional.”7 It is a principle I deeply believe in. And it
says all we need to know about the role racial discrimination should
be allowed to play in public education—absolutely none.
The second reason is best represented by the straightforward lan-
guage found in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19648: “No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national ori-
gin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”9 These words, like those in Brown, are
clear. They remain, at least on paper, the law of the land. Yet the
categorical prohibition against race-based discrimination—which
these words represent—has come under severe challenge in recent
years, beginning with the position taken by the University of Michigan
in Gratz and Grutter. This prohibition remains under challenge in the
Fisher case.10
You just heard Syracuse University Chancellor11 Nancy Cantor’s
description of the arguments often cited in support of the idea that
racial diversity—in and of itself—fosters a better, more positive learn-
ing experience.12 Indeed, the supposed educational benefits of this
diversity are said to be so compelling that they outweigh the costs asso-
ciated with the use of race to achieve them.13
the law school places a very heavy emphasis on an applicant’s race in deciding whether to
accept or reject. . . . [There is] mathematically irrefutable proof that race is indeed an
enormously important factor.”).
5. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328, 330; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 257.
6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
7. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, Title VI, 78 Stat. 252 (1954) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012)).
9. Id.
10. Brief for Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No.
11-345), 2012 WL 3875237.
11. At the time of these remarks, Nancy Cantor was the Chancellor of Syracuse Uni-
versity. She is now Chancellor of Rutgers University-Newark.
12. Nancy Cantor, From Grutter to Fisher and Beyond: The Compelling Interest of Diversity
in Higher Education, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 261 (2013).
13. See id.
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Well let me suggest that even setting aside constitutional law prin-
ciples—principles that I believe prohibit the use of race for such a
purpose—the social science is not settled on the extent to which racial
diversity provides educational benefits.14 Indeed, one can offer ample
evidence that points to serious adverse consequences when racial di-
versity is achieved through racially discriminatory means.15
I. What’s at Stake in Fisher?
One of the most important potential issues for reconsideration by
the Supreme Court in Fisher16 is whether the so-called diversity ratio-
nale, first anointed in Grutter,17 provides a sufficient justification for
discriminating against college and university applicants on the basis of
race.18
14. See Roger Clegg & John S. Rosenberg, Against “Diversity,” 25 ACAD. QUEST. 377,
382-87 (2012); ALEXANDER W. ASTIN, WHAT MATTERS IN COLLEGE: FOUR CRITICAL YEARS
REVISITED 363 (1st ed. 1993) (“The values, attitudes, self-concept, and socioeconomic status
of the [student’s] peer group are much more important determinants of how the individ-
ual student will develop than are the peer group’s abilities, religious orientation, or racial
composition.”); Peter Schmidt, Debating the Benefits of Affirmative Action, CHRON. HIGHER
ED., May 18, 2001, at A25 (quoting Dr. Astin) (“[The claim that more diverse campuses
better educate their students] is yet to be convincingly demonstrated . . . .”); J. MITCHELL
CHANG, RACIAL DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: DOES A RACIALLY-MIXED STUDENT POPULA-
TION AFFECT EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 150 (1996) (“Racial diversity has (a) a negative di-
rect impact on overall satisfaction with college among students of color; (b) a marginal,
indirect negative impact on retention among all students; and (c) no effect on intellectual
self-concept, social self-concept, or college GPA.”).
15. See Clegg & Rosenberg, supra note 14; Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative
Action, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 41–42 (1992) (quoting various minorities who express
feeling stigmatized by affirmative action policies); Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 368, 371-72 (2004) (arguing that
race-neutral policies could improve bar passage rates); RICHARD H. SANDER & STUART TAY-
LOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP,
AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT, 49-65 (2012); Transcript of Deposition of Lehman
at 97-98, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928) (testi-
mony of the then dean of University of Michigan Law School) (“I do know that there are
members of minority racial groups in the country who oppose the explicit consideration of
racial diversity as one factor in admissions because they personally find it stigmatizing.”).
16. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
17. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (“[T]oday we endorse Justice Pow-
ell’s view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of
race in university admissions.”).
18. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 13, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) (stat-
ing that, while not challenging the diversity-as-a-compelling interest doctrine, there is a
flaw in Grutter that needs to be addressed); Brief for Congressman Allen B. West as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) (“[T]he University
of Texas . . . ha[s] no power under the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in
affording educational opportunities to its citizens.”) (internal quotations omitted); Brief
for Coal. of Bar Ass’ns of Color as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16, Fisher,
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Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., in his 1978 opinion in Bakke,19 first
mentioned that an interest in diversity might be a legitimate basis
upon which to use race as a factor in university admissions. His discus-
sion of this interest is found in a portion of his opinion in Bakke in
which no other Supreme Court justice joined,20 and  played no role in
the outcome of that case. Nevertheless, in Grutter without any real
analysis, Justice O’Connor simply adopted Justice Powell’s lonely view
in Bakke.21 Thus was born the diversity doctrine, which currently per-
mits a public university to use race as a factor in deciding who receives
an offer of admission or a letter of rejection. And today, in the wake of
Grutter, our highest court in Fisher is reconsidering the methods
adopted by many universities in their efforts to achieve racial diversity.
However, before going any further, there are two things the
Michigan cases and Fisher are not about.
First, the Michigan cases were not about criticizing the general
concept of the educational benefits of diversity (the same can be said
of Fisher). And second, the Michigan cases were not about dismantling
affirmative action programs (neither is Fisher).
II. A General Observation Regarding Diversity
With regard to diversity, I offer a general proposition with which
hopefully everyone can agree: Every individual is unique. As a conse-
quence, anytime there is more than a single individual present, the
group is diverse. Every person adds to the diversity of a group, to a
community, and to our country. This is true, even of individuals who
share an immutable characteristic like a similar skin tone.
None of the plaintiffs in the Michigan cases ever argued that di-
versity was a bad thing. On the contrary, they acknowledged that all
sorts of diversity could be good and provide educational benefits to
students.22 But they also said that no matter how beneficial diversity
133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) (“[T]here remains a compelling governmental interest in
achieving and maintaining critical mass in the legal profession, and race-conscious admis-
sions programs are a proper means to achieve that goal.”); Brief for Ass’n of Am. Med.
Colls. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 30, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No.
11-345) (“Altering Grutter Would Disrupt Admissions Practices Crafted In Reliance Upon
the Court’s Precedents.”).
19. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
20. Id. at 320–24.
21. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323–25.
22. See id. at 339 (arguing that the school’s plan was not narrowly tailored but not
arguing against the educational benefits of student body diversity); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 287–88 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821,
850 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“The court does not doubt that racial diversity in the law school
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might be, no school is justified in using racially discriminatory policies
to achieve it.23
III. Affirmative Action
Nothing I say is intended to suggest we should dismantle affirma-
tive action plans. I am a proponent of affirmative action. I always have
been. Properly defined, affirmative action has nothing to do with race.
Quite the contrary, affirmative action plans were originally intended
to eliminate race as an obstacle to equal opportunity.24 It is for that
reason I take the position that we should never end affirmative action.
Instead, what we need to do is to end—and not mend—our mis-
characterization of affirmative action, which unfortunately has metas-
tasized into a system of racial preferences, far removed from the
original intent of the phrase.
And now for a little history lesson: Most Americans are com-
pletely unaware that the phrase affirmative action was first coined by
President John F. Kennedy in a 1961 Executive Order.25 In the pream-
ble to his executive order, President Kennedy included powerful con-
stitutional principles:
WHEREAS discrimination because of race, creed, color,or national
origin is contrary to the Constitutional principlesand policies of
the United States; and
WHEREAS it is the plain and positive obligation of theUnited
States Government to promote and ensure equalopportunity for all
qualified persons, without regard to race,creed, color, or national
origin . . . .26
President Kennedy then issued the following directive:
(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employeeor
applicant for employment because of race, creed, color,or national
origin. The contractor will take affirmative actionto ensure that ap-
plicants are employed, and that employeesare treated during em-
ployment, without regard to their race,creed, color, or national
origin. . . .
may provide . . . educational and societal benefits. Nor are these benefits disputed by the
plaintiffs in this case.”).
23. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317.
24. Exec. Order No. 10925, § 301(2), 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961).
25. Nat’l Org. of Women, The Origins of Affirmative Action, NOW.ORG, http://www.now
.org/nnt/08-95/affirmhs.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (“The actual phrase ‘affirmative
action’ was first used in President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 Executive Order 10925 . . . .”);
See also Affirmative Action, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
affirmative_action (listing Executive Order No. 10925 as the legal origin of affirmative
action).
26. Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961).
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(2) . . . all qualified applicants will receive consideration for em-
ployment without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin.27
As you can see, this Executive Order directed the federal govern-
ment to take affirmative action to ensure that race would not be used
to exclude people from government employment and contracting op-
portunities.28 In other words, it was a directive to remove—not add—
race as a factor in government employment. Yet sadly, affirmative ac-
tion has evolved into a system where race matters. And in Grutter, it
mattered a great deal.
IV. Reestablishing the True Meaning of Affirmative Action
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and retired Army General
Colin Powell once said it best: “If affirmative action means programs
that provide equal opportunity, then I am all for it. If it leads to pref-
erential treatment, . . . I am opposed. . . . The Army, as a matter of
fairness, made sure that performance would be the only measure of
advancement.”29
Further support for the notion that race has no legitimate role to
play in the most important aspects of our lives comes from the father
of retired Army Major General Alfredo Valenzuela. Upon Major Gen-
eral Valenzuela’s father’s return from World War II, his father said:
“[W]e all wear green and we all bleed red, . . . there is no difference
and don’t let ethnicity play a role.”30
Of course, opposing the use of racial preferences is nothing new.
For example, over 150 years before these generals made their com-
ments, Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, a noted abolitionist, estab-
lished a school for relief and refuge of homeless, indigent orphans.31
In his will, Congressman Stevens wrote: “They shall all be carefully
educated in the various branches of English education and all indus-
trial trades and pursuits. . . . No preference shall be shown on account of race
or color, in the admission or treatment.”32 What is important to note here
is that the long-ago position taken by Representative Stevens, as well as
27. Id. § 301(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
28. Id. § 301(1).
29. COLIN POWELL, MY AMERICAN JOURNEY 591-92 (1995).
30. Alfredo Valenzuela, Retired Major General of the U.S. Army, Remarks at the Fifth
Meeting of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission 41 (January 14, 2010) (transcript
on file with author) [hereinafter Remarks by Alfredo Valenzuela].
31. Thaddeus Stevens Biography, THADDEUS STEVENS COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY, http://
www.stevenscollege.edu/301396.ihtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
32. Thaddeus Stevens, Last Will and Testament of Thaddeus Stevens of Lancaster,
Penn. 6–7, July 30, 1867 (emphasis added).
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the more contemporary arguments of General Powell and Major Gen-
eral Valenzuela, are all founded upon the same bedrock principle ar-
gued by Thurgood Marshall in Brown v. Board of Education.33
In Brown, when he was serving as one of the counsel for the plain-
tiffs, Thurgood Marshall demanded that the Supreme Court enter a
decree commanding the Topeka Board of Education to “discontinue
use of race or color as a criterion for admission of students” to public
schools.34
Mr. Marshall’s words to the Court are as relevant today as they
were when they were first penned back in the early 1950s as part of
the voluminous briefing in Brown.
To me, that was what the Michigan cases were all about, or should
have been about: reaffirming the principle adopted in Brown over a
half century ago that “[r]acial discrimination in public education is
unconstitutional.”35
Sadly, however, the Court in Grutter deviated so horribly from this
principle that this country is now firmly back to a situation where race
matters under the law.
Think about that.
“Race matters!”
That was the claim of the old-line segregationists—a concept de-
cidedly rejected decades ago. Yet, apparently it was not. And the battle
has moved to a very different playing field. Rather than equal oppor-
tunity irrespective of color or ethnicity, which has been our society’s
goal for more than a half century, we have reverted to an openly race-
conscious concept that has been relabeled as an interest in diversity.
Earlier I mentioned Major General Valenzuela’s statements about
not letting race or ethnicity come between brothers-in-arms.36 His re-
marks were given before a panel of the Military Leadership Diversity
Commission.37 Sadly, if the drafters of that Commission have their
way, and their policy recommendations end up being adopted, the
day when race does not matter may never come. One of the many
questionable observations found in the Commission’s report is that
although good diversity management rests on a foundation of fair
treatment, it is not about treating everyone the same. This can be a
33. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
34. See Memorandum Brief for Appellants at 11, Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), 1954
WL 45731.
35. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Brown II, 349 U.S. at 298.
36. Remarks by Alfredo Valenzuela, supra note 30.
37. Id.
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difficult concept to grasp, especially for leaders who grew up with
the [equal-opportunity]-inspired mandate to be . . . color . . . blind.
Blindness to difference, however, can lead to a culture of assimila-
tion in which differences are suppressed rather than leveraged.38
These observations raise several serious questions. If the mandate
is to treat everyone fairly, how does that translate into “not . . . treating
everyone the same”?39 For example, in what way would it be fair to
treat an individual applicant for a seat in the USF law school class of,
say, 2016, differently from another because of his or her skin color?
Next, why is the traditional “[equal opportunity]-inspired man-
date”40 of colorblindness no longer the preferred model?
And lastly, aren’t the most successful leaders those men and wo-
men who do, in fact, create a culture of assimilation within their respec-
tive organizations in which racial differences are rendered completely
irrelevant? Isn’t that what the equal opportunity-inspired mandate has
always sought to achieve? Isn’t that what Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 requires?41
With these questions in mind, let us return home and review the
words of the University of San Francisco’s Affirmative Action / Equal
Opportunity policy. It clearly and unambiguously states that “the Uni-
versity does not discriminate in employment, educational services, and
academic programs on the basis of an individual’s race [or]
color . . . .”42 This policy, which includes the critical statement about
non-discrimination, is wholly consistent with President Kennedy’s ini-
tial use of the phrase affirmative action. In other words, the phrases
affirmative action, equal opportunity, and non-discrimination are de-
scribed as one and the same here at USF. That is to say, all three
phrases are fully consistent with an unambiguous policy that forbids
discrimination based on race. There is nary a word anywhere in this
statement suggesting that USF is committed to anything other than a
strict policy that prohibits racial discrimination on this campus and an
equally strict policy that guarantees equal opportunity to every person
38. MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMM’N, FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION: DI-
VERSITY LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST-CENTURY MILITARY FINAL 18 (2011) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
42. Equal Opportunity and Non-Discrimination Policy, UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
http://www.usfca.edu/catalog/policies/non-discrimination/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2014)
(emphasis added).
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within this University without regard to race, color, or national
origin.43
That, I submit, is exactly the way it ought to be. For if nothing
else is clear, this one thing should be clear: When it comes to judging
the value and worth of our fellow citizens, race should never matter.
Conclusion
On Veterans Day 2011, the United States Navy hosted a unique
event—a college basketball game staged on the flight deck of the USS
Carl Vinson.44 The First Carrier Classic featured teams from two of the
premier college basketball powers: Michigan State University and the
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (“UNC”).45 Both of the par-
ticipating universities are among the great universities in the coun-
try.46 It is likely that very few, if any, representatives of these two
universities receive more public attention than do their elite Division I
basketball team members.
When the teams took to the floor on the Carl Vinson, there were a
couple of things one might have noticed. First, the obvious and most
important factor: Five players wore the green & white uniforms of
Michigan State. The other five wore the Carolina blue uniforms of
UNC.
A second observation which may have gone entirely unnoticed
was that out of the ten starting players—and I’m going to make a gen-
eralization here based on race—nine were young men who likely
identify as black while only one likely identifies as white.47 To the best
of my knowledge, not a single Latino American, Native American, or
Asian American was among them.
So, did Michigan State’s team racially reflect the university it was
representing? Did the team racially reflect the state it represented, or
43. Id.
44. Michigan State vs. North Carolina Recap, SI.COM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn
.com/basketball/ncaa/men/gameflash/2011/11/11/71192_recap.html (last visited Jan.
5, 2014); USS Carl Vinson—Carrier Classic: UNC-Michigan State, SI.COM, http://sports
illustrated.cnn.com/multimedia/photo_gallery/1111/carrier.classic/ (last visited Jan. 5,
2014).
45. Michigan State vs. North Carolina Recap, supra note 44.
46. See National University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://colleges.us
news.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/ (last visited
Jan. 28, 2014) (ranking in 2014 University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and Michigan
State University numbers thirty and seventy-three in the country, respectively).
47. See Michigan State vs. North Carolina Recap, supra note 44.
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the city of East Lansing? The same questions could be asked for the
team from UNC.
Of course, in my view, if you were wearing the camo-tinged green
and white uniforms, you were a proud Michigan State Spartan.
If you were wearing the Carolina blue uniforms, you were a
proud Tar Heel. Your race didn’t matter at all.
Every week, the field house in East Lansing, Michigan and the
one in Chapel Hill, North Carolina are filled with fans of all races
cheering for their respective team. Do you think anyone in either field
house is concerned that the racial composition of the teams does not
perfectly reflect the university’s or state’s racial demographics? And if
there are a few outliers who actually do care, does that also mean we
should care?
How were these players chosen to start this first Carrier Classic?
That seems fairly simple. The standards are straightforward. And if
coaches are doing their jobs correctly the same standard is applied to
each young man on both of these teams—irrespective of his race or
ethnicity. They were selected as starters for nothing other than their
merit as basketball players (which includes a large dose of strong char-
acter in order to be great players).
Are these young men diverse?
They absolutely are diverse, because each is a unique individual.
Each of them deserves our respect and—more importantly—each de-
serves equal treatment by being measured against the same set of stan-
dards regardless of skin color, ethnicity, or any other immutable
factor.
A person’s race tells us nothing about his or her talent, skills,
honor, courage, intelligence, or dedication to any task.
To paraphrase Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., a man’s skin color tells
us nothing—absolutely nothing—about the content of his
character.48
Was Dr. King right?
I believe he was.
As for the colors that matter here at USF? There are only two that
seem important: green and gold. The rest make absolutely no
difference.
48. Martin Luther King Jr., I Have a Dream, Address at the March on Washington for
Jobs and Freedom 5 (Aug. 28, 1963), available at http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/
dream-speech.pdf [hereinafter King, I Have a Dream].
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That is the simple message I hope the Court in Fisher opts to
embrace.
Postscript: The Supreme Court Does a Catch and Release in
Fisher49
The United States Supreme Court’s widely anticipated decision in
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,50 sadly, contained little of sub-
stance. While the case was reversed and remanded to the Fifth Circuit
for further proceedings (to reconsider whether the record adequately
demonstrates that University of Texas’s (“UT”) policy is narrowly-tai-
lored),51 the controversy between the named parties is all but moot
from a practical standpoint. The plaintiff/petitioner, Abigail Fisher,
has graduated from college, albeit from Louisiana State University
rather than from the defendant, UT. And by all accounts UT is still
using race as a factor in undergraduate admissions,52 which is the rea-
son it found itself in court in the first instance when it allegedly re-
jected Ms. Fisher, in part, because of her skin color.
It had been expected that the Court fully intended to reevaluate
(pro or con) its ten-year-old decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.53 After all,
Grutter, for the first time since Brown v. Board of Education, granted
colleges and universities the right to use race as an explicit factor in
49. The following section contains Mr. Purdy’s brief observations of the Supreme
Court’s June 24, 2013 decision in Fisher, four months after his presentation at the
University of San Francisco School of Law Symposium.
50. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
51. Id. at 2421-22 (“Strict scrutiny must not be strict in theory but feeble in fact. In
order for judicial review to be meaningful, a university must make a showing that its plan is
narrowly tailored . . . .”).
52. Application Review, U. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, http://bealonghorn.utexas.edu/fresh
men/decisions/review (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (click on “What are special circum-
stances?”) (listing race as a special circumstance that may be considered); University of Texas
at Austin President Responds to Supreme Court Ruling, U. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN (June 24, 2013),
http://www.utexas.edu/news/2013/06/24/university-of-texas-at-austin-president-re
sponds-to-upreme-court-ruling/ (“Today’s ruling will have no impact on admissions deci-
sions we have already made or any immediate impact on our holistic admissions policies.”).
53. See, e.g., Marı´a C. Ledesma, Revisiting Grutter and Gratz in the Wake of Fisher: Looking
Back to Move Forward, 46 EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. 220, 220 (2013), available at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10665684.2013.779556#tabModule
(“[C]olleges and universities across the country are anxiously awaiting the High Court’s
decision, which is poised to alter the course of race-conscious practices across postsecon-
dary institutions nationwide.”). When certiorari was requested, there seemed to be little
reason for the Court to consider the case. By all accounts, the Circuit Court of Appeals had
faithfully applied Grutter’s holding to UT’s policy, which was, in fact, modeled after the
policy approved in Grutter. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217–18 (5th Cir.
2011).
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admissions.54 Grutter signaled a return to one of the most negative as-
pects of our nation’s racial history—a history where, tragically, race
mattered. It was expected that Fisher would reconsider Grutter’s strik-
ing constitutional detour from the principle announced in Brown
when it came to matters involving race and public education. In fact,
the extraordinary length of time between oral arguments (October
10, 2012) and the issuance of the decision (June 24, 2013) suggested
that a substantive re-analysis of Grutter would be forthcoming.55 Alas,
no re-analysis occurred.
The Court’s failure will impact the thousands of current and fu-
ture college applicants—innocent of any wrongdoing—who face the
prospect of experiencing legalized racial discrimination at the hands
of our nation’s flagship public universities. The impact will also be felt
by admissions personnel who are tasked with deciding which appli-
cants receive a letter of acceptance or a letter of rejection based, in
part, on the color of an applicant’s skin.
As for the opinion itself, Fisher looks like something that was cob-
bled together at the last minute, drafted principally to avoid an inter-
nal Court fight over whether Grutter should be reaffirmed or
overruled, in whole or in part.56 It is clear that that particular fight was
sidestepped. What prompted the Court to coalesce around an end
product, notable mainly for its avoidance of the key issues in Grutter,57
is pure speculation. What is not in doubt, however, is that Fisher con-
ducted no meaningful reassessment of Grutter.
It seems clear that the Court avoided the potentially difficult is-
sues presented principally because of the puzzling decision made by
Fisher’s counsel not to seriously challenge any aspect of Grutter.58 Per-
54. Brown did not involve college or university admissions, but the principle it an-
nounced—that “racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional,”—was not
limited to the context in which it was decided. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955). See, e.g.,
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2423–25 (Thomas, J., concurring).
55. Given the brevity of the opinion (the majority opinion is only slightly more than
seven pages in length, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415-22), one wonders why it could not have
been issued within a few weeks, or, at most, a few months following the oral arguments.
56. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (“There is disagreement [within the Court] about
whether Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal protection in approving this
compelling interest in diversity. But the parties here do not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of
Grutter’s holding.”) (citation omitted); id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Arguably the two major issues were: (1) whether the use of race as a factor in
college and university admissions, particularly for the non-remedial purpose of enrolling a
diverse student body, violates the Equal Protection Clause; and (2) whether strict scrutiny
was properly applied by the Grutter court to the race-conscious program at issue in that
case. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322, 328.
58. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419.
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haps prompted by other Justices friendly to Grutter’s diversity ratio-
nale, Justice Kennedy apparently decided that if the parties did not
challenge the validity of Grutter, the Court would forego a reassess-
ment, even if some members of the Court thought it was warranted. In
the end, it was a terrible punt of several important issues, including
what role, if any, race should continue to play in the all-important
sphere of public education, and assuming it continues to play a role,
whether Grutter got it right in how such policies should be judicially
tested.59
The only saving grace is that Justice Kennedy (and the Court)
rather surprisingly reversed the Fifth Circuit, which had upheld UT’s
Grutter-like policy.60 If all the Court was going to do in the end was
apply Grutter to the facts in Fisher, it is surprising the Court didn’t sim-
ply uphold UT’s policy, particularly since it is virtually indistinguish-
able from the law school policy upheld in Grutter.61
Again, it is speculation, but perhaps the reversal in Fisher is Justice
Kennedy’s way of saying what he said in dissent in Grutter, i.e., that
Grutter wasn’t really all that great a decision.62 Perhaps, too, the rever-
sal in Fisher was Kennedy’s message to the lower courts on remand, to
wit: Read the nuance I’ve included in Fisher to see if you can discern
why Grutter really didn’t get it right from a strict scrutiny / narrow tailor-
ing aspect. See if you—the Fifth Circuit—can correct Grutter’s short-
comings. In other words, carefully read my dissent in Grutter and apply
what I said there to UT’s Grutter-like policy.
In conclusion, it is difficult to say much substantive about Fisher
without reviewing every word of Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter.63
A review of the dissent makes the outcome in Fisher—at least to this
point (assuming it may return to the Court at some later date)—even
more bewildering.
One final comment: Notwithstanding the dodge by the Court,
two Justices, Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, deserve
awards for honesty. Both were undeterred by Petitioner’s failure to
challenge Grutter.
59. See id. at 2421 (“[T]he parties do not challenge, and the Court therefore does not
consider, the correctness of [the manner in which the Court approved the plan in
Grutter].”).
60. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
61. See, e.g., Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (“[The University of Texas] has taken care to
follow the model approved by the Court in Grutter . . . .”).
62. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387–96 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
63. The author’s detailed commentary on Fisher will appear in 79 MO. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2014).
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For his part, Justice Thomas was once again eloquent in discuss-
ing his opposition to the use of race in public education and left no
doubt he would vote to overrule Grutter.64 It is not a stretch to suspect
that much of our nation’s citizenry—arguably a majority—would have
been delighted had Justice Thomas’ views in Fisher been the unani-
mous opinion of the Court (similar in nature to the landmark deci-
sion in Brown).
For her part, Justice Ginsburg left no doubt she would strongly
reaffirm Grutter. In her view, nothing in the Constitution should pre-
vent our flagship institutions from adopting race-conscious policies in
order to address “the lingering effects of ‘an overtly discriminatory
past,’ [and] the legacy of ‘centuries of law-sanctioned inequality.’”65
While neither precedent nor, respectfully, logic support her position,
Ginsburg held firm that the history of societal injustices is reason
enough to permit colleges and universities to engage in race-con-
scious decision making.
In the end, had Justice Thomas’s view prevailed, Fisher might have
joined the pantheon of landmark decisions leading us ever closer to
Dr. King’s dream.66 Someday, perhaps, his dream will be realized. But
it is not likely to happen in this case, no matter the outcome on
remand.
64. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349–78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
65. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing dissenting opinion in
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003)).
66. See King, I Have a Dream, supra note 48, at 5 (“I have a dream that my four little
children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their
skin but by the content of their character.”).
